Non-Immigrant Labor Policy in the United States
Vernon M . Briggs, J r .
The employment of foreign workers as a supplement to the domestic labor force has been a recurrent public policy issue throughout much of the history of the United States. Under specific circumstances, nonimmigrant workers have been allowed legal access to the American labor market. They should not be confused with illegal immigrants who do not have such a privilege. The legislative and administrative actions that have authorized non-immigrant programs traditionally have been shrouded in controversy. Policy concerns have centered upon both the economic effects of non-immigrant workers on working conditions for citizen workers and the special restrictions often imposed on no~n-immigrants that would be considered unfair and often illegal if applied to citizen workers.
Included among the various reforms of the nation's immigration system for the 1980s have been a host of proposals to alter the role of nonimmigrant policy. It has been suggested that the policy can serve as a means to overcome specific labor shortages and to reduce the general problem of illegal immigration. T o understand its potential to accomplish these goals, it is necessary to place non-immigrant policy in an evolutionary context. For if we examine isolated events at different points in history, the policy seems to be merely ad hoc reactions to those events of a particular time. A long-term perspective, however, reveals developmental patterns. Recognition of these themes and characteristics is essential to any effort to evaluate the efficacy of contemporary non-immigrant policy as well as the pending proposals that call for an expansion of such endeavors.
The author is Professor o f Labor Economics, Corneil University.
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Reproduced with permssion of the copyrght owner Further reproduction prohibted without permisson Tlir .-11rr,-rrilrtti P I o,qr nr1i~: Thr P I Wj9F? E Y~C I~C I I I P T h e initial effort to cqtnhlish hy law the right of American employers tv recruit ;rnd hirc fvreign I:ih~>r t o \v~>rk in the Unitcd States was the Contr;lct L;lhar Act of I S h l . Enoctctl as ;I wartinic measure, i t was repealed in 1868 although pri\'i~te groups continued the practice with little interruption for many yr.;lrs ;~ftcr\v:rrJ. During most of this period, the nation had cssentinlly all <>pen ininiigr.lti~rn policy to anyone except the Chinese. Thus, technically speaking, the contract lahor era docs not represent a non-immigrant prtrgrani. Thosc persona w h o were recruited were encouraged to stay as permanent immigrants. Although thc Alien Contract Law fin:llly banncd contract labor in 1885. its principles laid the conccptu;ll foundation for subsequent non-immigrant programs.
Only months aftcr the Llnited State:, ennstcd the most restrictive immigration legislation in its hihtory u p until that time-the Im~nigration Act of 191 7-it initiated the fil-st puhlisly sanctioned foreign Iahor program.' In response to strong pressure from the large agricultural growers of the Southwest. Congress includeil in the act a provision that wcmld allow entry of "temporary wc>rl~,rs" from Westcrn Hemisphere nations w h o were "otherwise inadniissihic." I n hlny 191 7, with the nation at war, Congress ;iuthorized such a temporary inrni worker program with Mexico. Under its terms were n~l s designed to protect both citizen workers and Mexican workers a s well a s to assure that tlic tvfcxicans returned home after completing their work. But, a:, has heconic the historic pattern with these types of programs. "torus elahorate rules were unenforced." ' T h e Ilnited States ennctc~l this temporary worker program during World V/nr I as being in the national interest. It was suhsequently extended until 1912. It ended when its ratinnale a s a national defense policy could n o longer be rnaintainccl. .Also, organized lahor contended that the prograni undermined !he cc~rnoniic welfare of citizen workers. Other critics believed that there wcre n o lahor shortages hut only opportunistic sniployers who wished t o tnp a secure source of cheap and docile workers for their own private galn. During the lifespan of the program, 76,862 hlcxican worl,ers were admitted t o t h s United States, of wliom less than half returned t o hlesir~o:' The A l~. r i r o~~ Lobnr Pri~grntti With the coming of World War 11. the military manpower requirements of the United St:ites and its rel:~ted mnnufacturing lahor needs led t o 3ssertions that another labor shortxge existed in the agricultural sector.
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The growers of thc Southwcst had forcsccn thcse developments and in 1941 thcy unsuccessfully requested anothcr contract labor program by the fcdcral govcrnmcnt. By mid-1 942, howcvcr, the govcrnment had come to favor thc program, but thc govcrnmcnt of Mexico balked at the prospect of a formal intcr-governmental agrecmcnt. T h e unrcgulatcd hiring of Mexican citizens by foreign nations is prohibited by the Mexican Constitution of 19 1 7. 4 Negotiations bctwccn thc two governments ultimately re:;ultcd in a formal agrccmcnt in August 1942 that launched the Mexican 1-abor Program-more popularly known as the "braccro program."" Undcr its terms, Mcxican workers werc allowed t o work in agricultural jobs in the Unitcd Statcs and thcy wcre t o be afforded numerous protections with rcspcct to housing, transportation, food, mcdical nceds, and wages. Included within an omnibus appropriations act known a s P.L. 45, the program was cxtendcd by subsequent enactments until December 3 1, 1947. It continucd informally and without regulation until 1951. In that year, under the guise of anothcr war-related labor shortage, the bracero program was revivcd by P.L. 78.
Undcr P.L. 78, Mexican workers could be contractcd for work in thc United States. Employers werc rcquired t o pay the prevailing agricultural wagc, to provide free housing, t o provide adequate mcals a t a reasonable chargc, and t o pay all transportation costs from the work site t o thc government reception centers near the bordcr. Employcrs scldom mct thcse requirements." Braccros were exempt from both social security and income taxcs, which meant that thcy receivcd morc income than would a citizen workcr employed at the identical money wage ratc. T h c scalc of the program can be seen in Table 1 .
In Mcxico, thc national government determined the actual allocation process by which the number of workers were to be chosen from among several of its states. T h c state governments, in turn, madc similar decisions for their cities and other political subdivisions. T h c Mcxican govcrnment sought t o distribute the job opportunities geographically rather than t o simply selcct workers from the available labor pools in the bordcr towns. Otherwise, it feared therc might be a mass internal migration t o the border region. There were far morc applicants in evcry recruiting center than there were available slots. Favoritism and bribery in the selection process became widespread.
The bracero program demonstrated prccisely how border labor policies can adverscly affcct citizen workers in the United States-especially, in this case, the Chicanos who composcd the bulk of the southwcstern agricultural labnr force. Agricultural employment in the Southwcst was re- moved from competition with the non-agricultural sector. At the program's peak, almost half a million braceros were working annually in the agricultural labor market of the Southwest. The availability of Mexican workers significantly depressed existing wage levels in some regions, modulated wage increases that would have occurred in their absence, and sharply compressed the duration of the employment period during which many citizen farm workers could find jobs.7 The thorough report on the bracero program by the President's Commission on Migratory Labor in 1952 found, with respect to wage trends for agricultural workers during the bracero era, "that wages by States were inversely related to the supply of alien labor."H Citizen farmworkers in the southwest simply could not compete with braceros. Braceros were totally subject t o the unilateral demands of employers. For this reason, they were especially appealing workers to employers. There were also numerous charges that employers either ignored or circumvented the provisions for the protection of wage rates and working conditions." The bracero program was also a significant factor in the rapid exodus of rural Chicanos between 1950 and 1970 to urban U.S. labor markets, where they were often poorly prepared to find employment and housing.lo The drive to repeal P.L. 78 was led by the AFL-CIO, various Chicano groups, and an array of other community organizations generally concerned with the welfare of low income workers. Arguing that in southwestern agriculture, the prevailing wage was in fact set by the braceros themselves rather than by domestic labor market factors, the Kennedy Administration promised in 1961 that much tighter administrative regulations would be imposed. Beginning in mid-1962, the Department of Labor set an "adverse-effect wage rate" for each state. These were minimum wage rates that the Department determined had to be paid t o prevent braceros from adversely affecting what would otherwise be marketdetermined wages for citizen agricultural workers. In most cases, the adverse wage rates were set higher than the prevailing wages. The adverse wage, however, had to be offered to citizen workers if the agricultural employer intended to seek foreign workers. Under these terms, the bracero program lost much of its attractiveness to employers. The bitter political struggle over the program came t o an end with the termination of the program on December 3 1, 1964. The only supporter of the program at the time was the Department of State, which believed that "the program has Vernon bf. Briggs, Jr.
hccn herieficinl t~ hicuien" and wnrncrl that even if the program were tcrmit1;l:ctl. hte'tican \\.<>I-kcrs \v~>ulcl lilcly continue to come anyhow-:llbeit illsgillly." I'his hame c,>ncltrsion was drawn hy t h~. Mexican gov-~, r n m e~l t . which fc;~rctl th:rt tlie h~-:lcer<>s h:~cl heen exposed t o the wages and working conditions of he Cinitcd St:~tes 2nd wcrc unlikely to be cnntent \vith thc poorel. upportunitic.5 at h~>rne." In fact. the nccclcration in 11ic rate o f ill~.g;~l irninigl..rti~>n frc>rn hlc'tict> can virtually he clnted t o the tern1i1ration of the bracero progr:rrn.
Follcnving the prcec~lcrit set hy the h4exican Labor Prngr;~m, the governments of tlie British \Crest Indies (including J:~ninien. St. Lucia. St. Vincent. Dorni~iic:~. :~ncl R:~rh:~~lc>r) and the Bahamas also entered into all intcr~overri1nc1it:11 ;rgrecnrent with the Llnit~'d States in April 1943 t o create a non-irnmigr:r11t progrilm to >upply ngricultural workers. Known as thc British West Indim Prtlgram (BCVI program), it was designed as a response to eollccrns hy employers along tlie East Coast that they t o o wcrc e s p c r i c n c i~~g \vt~rtin~e lahnr shortngcs. As most BWI workers spoke English. they hzrd :rn 11~l~:lntage to ernploycrs over the Mexican workers :~\~ail:rt,le in thc hrilccro p r o g 3 n l .
Like thc I>r;lcern prc>gr;\ni, the BWI program wits formalized on the b;isis c>t P.I.. Temporary worker of distinguished ability or merit
H-1 16,838
Other temporary worker
H-2 22,832
Industrial trainee
H-3 3,309
Exchange visitor
1-1 53,319
FiancC (be) of U.S. citizen
Intra-company transfer categories permitted t o work legally and the corresponding number of admissions in 1978 for each classification. Among the non-immigrants permitted t o work as part of the regular labor force arc several classifications free t o change jobs at will. They are not linked contractually to employers. Among these, for instance, are foreign students who may legally work (F-1 workers) in any occupation if they receive permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service ( I N S ) . Most of the others are under some form of binding contractual obligations to their employers. Among these a r e H-1 workers (persons of distinguished merits and ability-such as opera singers, actors, and various professional workers); J-1 workers (exchange visitors in various in:ernational programs) ; and L-1 workers (intra-company transReproduced with permission of the copyright owner Further reproduction prohibited without permission fcrees of n~ulti-national corporations). Most of these workers a r e in whitecoll;rr occtrpatic>ns or other highly skilled jobs.
It is t h r H-2 progranr for "other tetnporary workers," however, that has generiitcd most of the controversy. I n 1 9 6 9 69.288 H-2 workersthe largest number ever-were admitted. T h e number h a s since declined ;~n t l leveletl 011 ti) around 23.000 3 year. Tahle ----
O~~~~~~r~n r i~~~t
Namhc-r Admirred tional clistrihution of all FI-2 workers in 1978. Within the H-2 classification, the largest single occupi~tion has generally been farm ~o r k c r s . '~ As the size of the program has declined. the proportion of the total w h o a r e ngricultural wclrkers has risen t o more than one-third of all H-2 workers.
T h e non-agrict~lturnl H-2 workers a r e occupationally dispersed. T h e largest group are professional a n d technical workers. generally people "of lower stzitus than those entering on H-1 visas" or exchange visitor^.'^ Most of these a r e writers, artists. and entertainers, followcd h y athletes and musicians.
Supposedly, H-2 workers can he admitted only ''if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or lahor cannot he found in this country." It is u p t o the Department of Labor t o decide whether citizen workers a r e available. I n making its determination, the department applies t h r system of "adverse wage rates." T h e final entry decision. however. resides not with the Department of L a h o r hut rather with the Department of Justice. Frequently, the latter overrules the former's decisions against admission.
H-2 workers d o not pay social security taxes, which means that the employer does not deduct the tax from the employee's wage nor does the employer have to match the tax, as is the case with citizen workers. H-2 workers are also exempt from unemployment compensation taxes on employer payrolls. Hence, an employer may secure H-2 workers a t wage costs below those paid to citizen workers even when the nominal rates are the same to both. Although many non-agricultural H-2 workers enter under contractual terms that tie them to specific employers, their wages and working conditions are not controversial nor are they seen a s any threat to citizen workers The same cannot be said for the agricultural H-2 workers or for the use of the entire H-2 worker program in the territories of G u a m and the Virgin Islands. These cases require brief elaboration.
Agricultural H-2 Workers
The H-2 program in agriculture incorporates all of the undesirable features of its forerunner, the bracero program. Workers are totally dependent upon their employers. Eligibility for the program often depends upon one's contacts with certain officials of one's home government. It is often considered a privilege to be selected. Corruption in the selection process is rampant. If chosen, the worker can be assured of the opportunity to return again only if his work and attitude please the U.S. employer. This is because the employer may "request by name" a set proportion (usually 5 0 percent) of this year's H-2 workers to return the next year. In effect, the workers must compete with one another on terms very favorable to the employer. If at any time the worker's demeanor is deemed unsatisfactory by his employer, the worker may be deported without an appeal. Given this system, "it is little wonder that H-2 aliens are 'hard working and diligent.' "lo Although several countries are involved a s sources of agricultural H-2 workers, about 90 percent of their annual numbers are from the British West 1nd.e~ (predominantly Jamaica). Their involvement a s H-2 workers is a continuation of the aforementioned BWI labor program, which was assumed into the H-2 program in 1952. Throughout the 1950s, the use of BWI workers increased, but the BWI was still small in comparison to the co-existing bracero program. Hence the BWI program escaped close scrutiny. When the bracero program was phased out in the early 1960% attention turned to the BWI program. The programs were so similar in
Reproduced w~t h permsslon of the copyr~ght owner Further reproduct~on prohblted wlthout permsslon t r~~c t u r e that the silnie arprnerlts that led to the ternlination of the hraccro program seemed logically tn :~pply to the BW1 progr;inl. T h e Departmcllt ot' 1-i~bor .lid issi~' more restrictive regulations in the early 1960s ancl again in the late 1070s for all H-2 workers. f h c enrployers crf H-2 agriallturnl wcwkerz have contended that the m i~j o r i~l t c r n a t i~c tr> H-2 \\.c>rkcrh is illcg:~l immigrant>. Illegal immigrants have been involvecl in Eiibt Coast :~gri;ultl~rc hut the incidence is helieved to ihe much less than has h c c~~ the case in :~gric~:lture in the Southwest. East Coast enlploycrs claim that it was the termination of the hracero program i l l thc Souih\vcst in 1964 th.11 led t o the widespread use of illegal imniigr;~nts in that region."" Thcy also contend that it ia diflic-ult t o attract citizen workers t o Ihese sci~scln;~l occupations."'
The series of fifty islancls that comprise the Virgin l s l a~~d s havc beIcmgccl to the Unitcc: States sincc their purch;rse from Denmark in 1917. At the time. free tr;~\,el to fincl employment was traditional throughout the Cari!>henn region. I'his practice continued until 1938 when the U.S. government ri3lr.d tlii~t th; pl-cvailing immigration statutes applied to the islands. All aliens who resided in thr. is1and.s a s of 1938 wcrc ruled to be legal r e i~l e n t ;~licns. During \VorlJ War 11. there was a need for unskilled workers :o huiltl up the defense forces on the island of St. Thomas to protect tlic P:~n:rmn Cano!. Workers from ncarhy French and British islands were i~llowed tc> work o n these projects. For reasons of cxpediencv, they wcrc permitted t o stay when the wiir ended The. enzrotrncnt of the H-2 provisions in I952 laid the groundwork for r:~tifici~tion o f the process alrenily hegun. In 1956. a temporary worker agreenient was reached hetwc.cn the llnited States and the ncarhy British Virgin Isl,~ncls. I n 19.59, the agrecnient was extended to includc the many other islands of thc British. Frcnch. ancl Dutch West Indies. These H-2 workers were supposccl t o bc cniployed only in the agriculturi~l and tourist ir~clustries. P,w forn~cr ctf~>rts were made t o see i f citizen workers were availahlc, but. in fact. by the enrly 1960s admission was permitted "for any job.""" By :he cricl of the 1900s. "alien lahor constituted roughly half of the Virgin lsli~nds Inhor f~lrce."~.' Before long. problems of housing, cclucntion. and social conditions for H-2 workers had become s o "terrible" that the FI-2 workers hird become "the higgest single prohlem" o n the islancls." It was even feared that if the status of these workers changed from H-2 t o rmident aliens that the native-horn population could lose political control of the islands.
Reproduced w~t h permlsslon of the copyr~ght owner Further reproduct~on proh~b~ted w~thout permlsslon By the 1970s. it was obvious to the Department of Labor that "the nonimmigrant aliens virtually determined the prevailing wage in many occupati~ns."~"he department, therefore, issu~:d indefinite labor certificattions to these H-2 workers and allowed them t o change jobs freely. It would n o longer make any effort to see if citizen workers were available. All pretense to the existence of a temporary work program was abandoned.
The Guam Labor Program
The island of Guam was ceded to the United States in 1898 as part of the treaty ending the Spanish-American War. Because of its strategic location in the mid-Pacific, it has remained a key military installation for the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was the first immigration statute to apply to Guam.
During World War 11, Guam was devastated. When the rebuilding process began, many residents sought jobs with the federal government because the private economy had been virtually destroyed. Against this backdrop, the government introduced a non-immigration labor program. Most of these foreign workers were admitted to d o construction work. In May of 1947, workers from the Philippines and other islands were hired under short-term contracts.'" In 1952, the status of these contract workers came into immediate conflict with the newly enacted H-2 provisions. Not only were these workers in a variety of occupations but many had been in G u a m for a number of years. They were not "temporary workers." Nonetheless, accepting the contention of the U.S. Navy that they were needed for defense purposes, the INS granted all blanket H-2 status in 1953.
Criticism mounted that H-2 workers on Guam were receiving "slave wages."27 There were also charges of extensive racketeering among the labor recruiters in the Philippines involving wage kickbacks and bribery in the selection process. Consequently, the INS announced in 1958 that the program for non-defense employers would be phased out. In 1960, the INS also decided to end the H-2 defense worker program. It feared that the H-2 arrangement was becoming a permanent part of the Guam economy and that few efforts were being made to train citizen workers for the jobs held by H-2 workers. In its place, however, non-immigrant workers continued to be admitted under the separate parole authority given to the Attorney General under the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit people temporarily for "emergent reasons" or reasons deemed to be in the "public interest."Zx In response to requests by defense contractors and the military on the island, non-immigrant workers from the Philippines were again admitted until 1975. T h e INS instituted a second parole program in I962 for temporary workers t o d o reconstruction work after the island was hit by a ssverc typhoon. This program was terminated in May 1 9 7 0 when the INS decided that the H-2 program was more appropriate for ccmstruction workcrs than the parole procedures.?"
The revival of thc H-2 program o n Guam came in response t o employer claims of labor shortages as a result of the expanding tourist industry in particular and thc islitnd's populatiun growth in general. The government of Guam also sought H-3 workers as n means of developing new industries-cspeci;~lly in agricullure and fishing. During the 1970s. the longstanding problem of many H-2 workers not complying with the terms of their ailmission surfaced. In othcr words, H-2 workers were overstaying their visas irntl hscoming illegal inimigrnnts."" By 1977 a Department of Labor report on labor market conditions on Guz~ni described then1 ns hcing "abysmal.":" T h e report noted that by 1076 one-si~tli of the island's civilian lahor force was N-2 workers. Moreover. H-2 \vorkers made up 82 percent of all persons employed in construction. 4'7 percent of agricultural workers. and 15 percent of workers in manufacturing." With reference to the working conditions, the report cited numerous ssaniplcs of worker abuse by employers and labor recruitcrs. It also clctailed the Lahor Department's inability to enforce existing labor standards in an environment in which workers were completely hcholdcn to their employers. T h e H-3 workers. under these circumstances, had bcconic preferred \vorkcrs for cmployers. Citizen workers could not conipetc with them on their terms, leading to a higher rate of unemployIlicnt for citizens. .As thc report noted. "alien workers constitute such a large proportion of the work force that the wages at which they are certified are the prevailing wage rntc~.",~:' It noted that the wages and working conditions wcrc being set not hy a free market but rather as a result of government policy.
A N e w Role For N o~~-l n l r ,~i~q r n n t 1S'orker.v
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the early 1980s. policy makers have su~:gested an entirely new role for the nation's non-immigrant labor policy. As illegal immigration became a national issue, students of the issue suggested that a non-immigrant program be included among the policy options to overcome this problem. Some advocated creation of a new non-immigrant labor program; others argued for expilnsion of the existing H-2 program in an effort to absorb and t o legalize the work done by many illegal immigrant^.^^ Implicit in all of the proposals was the assumption that most illegal immigrants d o work shunned by citizen workers. It was argued that the non-immigrant workers would not affect the wages and working conditions of citizen workers since they would-by virtual definition-not compete for the same jobs. None of these proposals contained any historical review of the nation's past experiences with non-immigrant programs. As a result, they are all merely conceptual programmatic sketches. None scratched the surface of such critical issues as how the workers are to be recruited; what their job entitlements are; what the limitations to be placed on employer prerogatives to limit exploitation are; what the means used to test for job certification are to be; and what protections assuring that prevailing standards for citizen workers and for unions will not be undermined are to be included.
In August 1977, the Carter administration included within its immigration reform package an explicit charge that the H-2 program be given a comprehensive r e v i e~.~U A l t h o u g h explicitly denying any interest in a bracero program, the administration implied that a n expanded temporary work program might meet the needs of some employers while not adversely affecting citizen workers. After studying the proposal, the Commission for Manpower Policy advised President Carter that it was "strongly against" any expanded H-2 program."" Rather than act directly upon the Carter administration's immigration proposals, Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to study all dimensions of the nation's immigration policy. In its subsequent report, the commission acknowledged that the H-2 program has been the source of significant criticism. Nevertheless, the Select Commission concluded that "a continuation of the program is necessary and preferable to the institution of a new one.":i' It made several suggestions to "streamline" the administration of the program. It recommended that employers be required to pay both social security and unemployment compensation payroll taxes on all H-2 workers in order to remove "inducements to hire H-2 workers over U.S. workers."3R The commission specifically concluded that there should not be any new temporary worker program established a s part of any strategy to combat illegal i m m i g r a t i~n .~~ By the time the Select Commission issued its report in 1981, the Reagan Administration had taken office. That administration formed a task force chaired by the Attorney General to study the commission's recommendations. When the task force released its resporlse in July 1981, it made no mention of the H-2 program but did propose that a new "experimental temporary worker program for Mexican nationals" be established." The "pilot program" \~o~~l d he for a two-year trial period and would be limited to 50,000 workers each year. If the concept proved workable it could be expanded to il million or s o foreign workers in subsequent years."
In response to the Select Conlniission's Report and the Reagan Administration's proposals. Congress held extensive hearings in the fall of 1982 (>I? all faccts of the n:ition's immigration policy. A result was a bipartisan hill called the Ininiigrntion Rcforni and Control Act of 1 9 8 1 (the Simpson-klorzoli hill) .'Vc overwhelmingly passed the Senate in August 1982 but died on the Rocir of the L1.S. Flouse of Representatives during the waning hours of the 97th Cangress. Differences over the role of the H-2 program was one of the major reasons that this importilnt hill was not cna~ted:~:~ It proposed thar the Department of Agriculture become involvecl in the administration of the tf-2 program for farm workers. It also proposed that the Department of Lnhor he required to expedite requests by employers for tl-2 workers in any industry. As there is n o ceiling on the number nf H-2. workers that can he admitted, opponents t o the H-2 program feared that these rlntl other changes would lead to a "backdcor hracerc> program" crf upwards of 500.000 non-immigrant workers.
:1i1 ,Isse.is~~re,~t o j the ''iVen~" Role for
S u~a -l~~i i i i i~~-n i~r
Lnhor P r o g m~i i s
As shoulcl he apparent from this review of the evolution of non-immigrant labor policy. iising it as a means of combatting illegal immigration ( a labor supply prohiem) would he a departure from its historic role ( a s a labor demand policy). Contemporary interest in non-immigrant worker programs is not based on the existence of a demonstrated need for such workers. The proposals for ncw or expanded non-immigrant labor programs are designed to supply more workers for unskilled and semi-skilled o~c u p~l t i o n s in primarily low-wage industries. These are precisely the same labor markets in which those subgroups of the labor force with the highest uneniployment rates in the nation a r e already found in disproportion. N o one is suggesting that there he a foreign worker program t o supply more workers for white-collar occupations. Not o r~l y would such proposals lead to charges of a "brain drain" from source nations, but also the opposition of the privileged and protected workers in domestic labor markets could he counted upon to kill any such idea at the moment of its conception.
Supporters of n new o r expanded non-immigrant wcrker program for the United States often assert that citizen workers will not d o the types of low-wage jobs that non-immigrants and illegal immigrrints perform." Hence, they conclude that there will be n o adverse effects on the domestic larbor force. Except for scattered anecdotes, no empirical evidence has been collected to support this view. I n fact, there is ample evidence that illegal immigrants d o compete directly for jobs in occupations that also attract millions of citizen workers.'" N o one can seriously argue that citizens are unavailable for certain types of jobs when each day the majority of persons who work in these occupations are citizen workers. The U.S. Department of Labor estimated that in 1981 there were 29 million workers (or 3 0 percent of the employed labor force) employed in "the kinds of low-skilled industrial, service, and agricultural jobs in which illegal aliens typically seek e m p l~y m e n t . "~~ It also estimated that 10.5 million workers were employed in jobs that paid the federal minimum wage ($3.35 an hour) and that an additional 10 million workers were receiving only 3 0 to 40 cents per hour more than the minimum wage. For the contentions of the advocates of new o r expanded non-immigrant worker programs to be valid, they must be willing to argue that there will be too few citizen workers available no matter what the wages or benefits associated with certain occupations in the American economy.
The presence of non-immigrant workers affects not only job opportunities but also wage levels in any given labor market. It is these wage effects that are part of the attractiveness of both non-immigrant workers and illegal immigrants to American employers. Employers are able to obtain workers in selected labor markets at less cost than would be the case in t h e i~ absence. It is also probable that foreign workers in lowwage American industries are less likely to make demands for job rights or to join unions.
Another flaw in thesc proposals is their intended magnitude. An expanded non-immrgrant program cannot d o anything to reduce illegal immigration unless the program is significantly large (at least in the 500,000-to 750,000-person range each ycar). But the larger the program, the greater the likelihood of adverse impact on citizen workers in selected labor markets. O n the other hand, if the scale of the program is small, where will the deterrence to illegal entry be? Politically, if not economically, speaking, there must be some limitations on the size of the program. If there is, what will stop others who are not selected from coming, or others, whose period of work has expired but who wish to remain, from staying? A new or expanded non-immigrant labor program does not resolve any of the prevailing problems with the nation's immigration policies while it adds a host of new ones.
Moreover, most of the advocates of new non-immigrant programs assume either implicitly-or explicitly in the case of the Reagan plan-that
Reproduced wlth permsslon of the copyr~ght owner Further reproduct~on prohblted wlthout permsslon the program would be a bilateral arrangement with Mexico. But illegal immigrants arc strcnming into the United States from many countries other than Mexico. If the prclgr;lni were restricted to Mexicans, it would d o nothing to reduce the flc~\\a from these other nations that, collectively, account for ahout one-half of all illegal immigration. One specific study has sought to examine the alleged need for foreign workers from the viewpoint t>f .American employers." Conducted in San Diego, California. in 198 1. it sought to discover if employers could pay the highcr, competirive wages necde~l to attract citizcn workers to certain industries in which illegal immigrants were wiclely used. Enlployers in ;tgriculture. restaurants. and elcctmnic manufacturing in Srtn Diego were intcrvicwed. Consistently. the employers lauded illegal immigrant workcrs ovci citizen workcrs. But rather than rely simply on the attitudes of employers. the study also investig:~ted whether employers would he forced tn go out of business or, in some s:rses, to reloc;ltc south of the horder if they had to conlpete actively for citizen workcrs. Employers were not asked if they \\'ere willing to pay n prevailing wage, but rather. "at what would you go out of business if you had to raise wages in order to attr;rct U.S. \vorlers?" The study found that the ceiling wage indicated by employers \\.as sutliciently high to attract citizen workers hut that the employcrs preferred the more profitable low wages that they could offer t o foreign workers. .4s ;I result. the study concluded that labor displacement \\-as occurring in the San Diego lahor market.4s Hence. the study concluded that "a foreign-worker program would simply legitimize this strat~g y . "~"
The past experience of the nation with non-immigrant lahor programs in low-wage industries has revealed another pernicious long-run effect of their operations. Namely, when workers come from economically less devclopcd countries t o the United States, they are made aware of opportunities that for many are beyond their previous imagination. T h e relatively higher wages and the broader array of job opportunities will cause many to find ways to remain. Rather than being an alternative to illegal immigration. these policies can-as history has repeatedly shown--become a method that fosters the phenomenon.
It should not he surprising that among the strongest voices in opposition t o proposals t o expand temporary worker programs have been those from groups closely associated with the protection of opportunities for low-wage workcrs. For example, a 1979 conference o n "Jobs for Hispanics"-sponsored by the Lahor Council for Latin American Advancement and attended by both Hispanic trade unionists and Hispanic community groups from across ttle country-took a strong and unanimous stand against a foreign worker program. In their conferenco manifesto, called the "Declaration of Albuquerque," they emphatically 5tatcd: "The federal government should nor includt any type of 'Bracero' program or foreign labor importation as a solution to the current problem of undocumented Similar strong statements of opposition to any type of new or expanded temporary foreign worker program were made to the Select Commission by the National Hispanic Task Force ( a group represcnting eight of the nation's largest Hispanic organizations), and by such groups as California Rural Legal Assistance, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., and the National Center for Immigrants' Rights."' All of these organizations have a long history of dedicated support for the low-income workers who would bear the brunt of the competition for jobs from foreign temporary workers.
When the Reagan administration announced in 1981 its support for a new foreign worker program, it was met by a chorus of opposition. The administration may have anticipated that the AFL-CIO would attack the proposal as being a mechanism for employers t o find "a docile and controllable work force."" It was totally unexpected, however, that the Mexican labor movement, the Confederacion d e Trabajadores d e Mexico ( C T M ) , would also strongly condemn the idea. In a "Manifesto to the People," the president of CTM, Fidcl Velasq~ucz, said that the Reagan proposal would convert Mcxican workers into "the biggest strategic labor reserve in contemporary history, subject to super-exploitation and servitudc."""he fact that C T M is an integral part of the Party of Revolutionary Institutions ( P R I ) , which has solely controlled Mexican political affairs since a few years after the Mexican revolution in 1917, meant implicitly that it was speaking for the Mexican government. Officially, the Mexican government did not comment on the Reagan proposal but it is inconceivable that C T M would speak out publicly in opposition t o the plan if it did not represent the consensus view of PRI.
Likewise, one of the strongest critics of the proposed H-2 changes embodied in the aforementioned Simpson-Mazzoli bill was the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund. Its president charged in October 1982 that "the Simpson-Mazzoli H-2 program is really just a replay of the bracero program" and that its provisions would actually "foster" illegal immigration just a s the old program did.64
Concluding Observations
There are features of the nation's non-immigrant labor policies that are both logical and beneficial to the economy and the quality of life of the nation. Yet within the broad ~linlensions of non-immigrant labor policy there has also been .I progrenimetic history that is not s o easy t o rationalize. It has usu;~lly involved tlie eniploymcnt of workers less skilled and less talented than thaw gsnsrally a\,ail:~hle within the American labor force hut who are, ncx:ethelesa. simil.rr in their employnient capabilities to csrtnin 1:ri-g~ segments of the American labor force. These instances ch;~llenpe thr. snnguinc ;ittitude surrounding non-in1migr:rnt lahor policy. f:or ; I the histcrry of these en~lsnvivs reve.11~. there has hsen ;I persistent theme of misuse n n~l ;~bu\c.. Rec.,tuns these non-immigr;~nt workcrs are unskilletl irnd frcrni r r l a t i~e l y i m p~v e r i s h~d backgrounds, they are easy prey for a corrupt sslectinn process in their hums nations over which the LTnitecl States has little control. Once in the United States. these workcrs a!-e often subject to working cnnclitic>ns that they may perccive to he desirable (relative ttr thc nlternative.; in thcir homelands) hut which affect the attri~clivenss\ oC the jirbs t i , citixsn workers. T o the dcgrcc that the prcvailing working stitnclz~rds begin ti, deteriorate as cmplnycrs hire noninirnigrant \\'orkers. c i t i~e n \vor.ker zravitate elsewhere and become less ;rv;~il;lble. En1ploye1-s scicin nc>t irnl) heconie dependent on non-immigrant workers but ;~l s o come to prefer them. c i s a preclict;~b!e ccrnsequcnce, non-immigrant programs for less skilled z~ncl lehs tzilentecl worker.; are consistently implemented under the guise of temporary worker prirgrams. But, as past experience in the United States and in Europe has tlsnionstrnted. these programs for low-wage workers hecome long-term slnlrces of lahor supply.5s They become an institutionolircd phentmienz~ tli;~t exerts a narcotic influence o n all parties invol\~etl in tlie cniploynient process. Employers. foreign workers, and the g~\ , e r n~i l e n t \ of S~U I -C C ~i >~l n t r i e s become atldicted. T h e rationale for their cxistc'ncc I>cct>me\ Icrst in the rsaroning proci-ss that justifies thcir continuation over tims. Originally. non-imniiyri~nt programs were created nnly cluring \v;lr srnergency periods. hut they traditionally continued long after tlie \v:\rs were over. With the advent of thc H-2 progrnm, they have bccomc n feature of peacetime, too, and there have been persistent propo\als to expand their sire and asope.
Non-imn~igrant worker programs in low-wags industries have been of irltcrct to cmplcryers primarily :IS a n1e:lns of reducing their costs of proiluction and enh;~~icing their c c~~t r o l aver their workcrs. Non-in~migrant low-wage workers arc attractive largely hr.cause of their dependence upon their employers. citi<en workers who compete with these n o n -i m m i~m n t workers fincl that their existing w<>rking conditions usually either become frozen o r dccli~ie. Under few circumstances will they improve. Efforts t o cstz~blish unions ;Ire ni,~dc more clificnlt. Moreover. it is likely that if em-ployers were forced t o rely o n citizen workers they would pay more attention to worker productivity issues such as enhanced supervision, provision of job training, and redesign of jobs. These have been some of the reactions by European employers t o a reduction in the number of foreign workers available to them since 1974.
Thus, non-immigrant labor policy can be seen t o be a topic that has played a long and often controversial role in American immigration policy. It is likely that it will continue to d o so. I t is t o be hoped, however, that usage of non-immigrant workers will be limited and constantly monitored. Certainly there is nothing in the programmatic history of such endeavors that would warrant their expansion under the pretext of being a cure for illegal immigration.
